Introduction
The aim of this paper is to assemble empirical evidence about the personal distribution of income, and the trends in income inequality over time, in the countries of Europe in the 1980s. It encompasses fifteen European countries: the Nordic countries, Switzerland, and all 12 members of the European Community (in 1994) apart from Greece. The United States is included as a point of reference.
Empirical facts are treacherous objects. The subject of income distribution is littered with "facts" that have ceased to hold or which proved on closer examination to be mere statistical artefacts rather than genuine economic regularities (remember Keynes' constancy of the share of labour?). The value of empirical generalisations has more often been found in the theoretical process used to explain them than in the empirical observation itself. It can be argued that thevery substantial -contribution of Kuznets' Presidential Address (1955) lay in his analytical framework rather than in the celebrated Kuznets curve indicating that inequality first rises and then falls as a country develops. This paper starts therefore from a position of modesty as to what can be achieved by a summary of the empirical evidence. Not the least of the reasons for this are the difficulties in making such comparisons, and it is with their limitations that the paper
On Entering the Minefield
The comparison of income distributions across countries, or across time, raises many problems. (For discussion of the problems of comparability across countries, see, among others, Lydall (1979) , van Ginneken and Park (1984) and Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) .) We need to decide what we want to measure and how far we can measure it on a comparable basis.
Inequality of What Among Whom?
In the empirical results, attention is concentrated on the distribution of disposable money income, that is income after direct taxes and including transfer payments. Several points should be noted: a) income rather than consumption is taken as the indicator of resources;
b) the definition of income falls considerably short of a Haig-Simons comprehensive definition, typically excluding much of capital gains, imputed rents, home production, and income in kind; c) no account is taken of indirect taxes nor of the benefits from public spending (other than cash transfers) such as health care or education or subsidies; d) the period of assessment is in general annual (although the UK evidence relates to weekly or monthly income).
These points mean that the variable measured may depart from that regarded as ideal. They also mean that the results may not be comparable across countries: for example, one country may help low income families through housing benefits (included in cash income), whereas another provides subsidised housing (not taken into account).
To the question "among whom", the standard answer here is the simplest: the distribution is that among individuals. The standard unit of assessment is however taken as the household, in that the incomes of all household members are aggregated and then divided by an equivalence scale to arrive at individual equivalent income. The equivalence scale is taken, for simplicity, to be the square root of the household size, so that the income of a household of 4 persons is divided by 2.0. The choice of the household, rather than a narrower unit such as the spending This grouping is rather surprising: it does not correspond to what might be expected in view of the known features of these societies. For this, and other, reasons, the Sawyer study met with lively reactions, notably from the French Government, which published a reply (Bégué, 1976) . There are indeed a number of serious problems, some of which are indicated in the 2 For further discussion of the sensitivity of the results, see Buhmann et al (1988) and Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) . 3 Throughout this paper, "Germany" refers to the former West Germany. For evidence about the distribution of income in East Germany, see Hauser et al (1991) and Hauser (1992) .
"Comments" column of Table 1:   a) the data are derived from different types of source. In the majority of cases, the source is a household survey, such as the US Current Population Survey, but in other cases the data are based on tax records (France, Netherlands and Norway) or a synthesis of different sources (Germany) . Some indication of the consequences are provided by Source: Sawyer (1976) , Table 6 .
To use the italicised figures, as Sawyer did in Table 1 , provides a rather misleading picture of the relative income inequality in the two countries. b) in two cases the data do not cover the whole population (Japan and Australia). The exclusion of part of the population may be expected in both cases to reduce the recorded degree of inequality. c) Sawyer did not have access to the original micro-data, and had in some cases to make aggregative adjustments, particularly in going from pre-tax income to post-tax income (the countries marked by a * in the Comments column). As described by Sawyer, "one of these distributions had to be estimated from the other by utilising data on the average amount of tax paid by each income class... inequality tends to be under-estimated since households have not been ranked by the derived income concept" (1976, p 12).
d)
The distributions relate to household income, but in the main figures no adjustment is 4 Usually known as the "Blue Book" estimate, which combines information from the tax records with household survey data and other information. made for differences in household size.
Approach Adopted Here
The approach adopted here does not overcome all of the problems of making comparisons across countries and across time, but reduces them significantly. Although the data are still drawn from different types of source ( Table 2 lists the countries covered and the origin of the data used in Sections 2-4), the great majority are now drawn from household income surveys, or their equivalent, and no use is made of synthetic data. (Synthetic data may well give a more accurate picture of the distribution; they are not however typically available as micro-data.) The main qualification concerns the French data, which come from tax records.
The major advantage compared to the situation in 1976 when Sawyer made his study is the availability of micro-data. The aim of the Luxembourg Income Study has been to assemble in one place a database containing survey data from many countries and to place them as far as possible on a consistent basis. 5 Access to the micro-data means that it is possible to produce results on the same basis starting from individual household records. It is therefore possible to make any desired adjustment for household size (eliminating problem (d) above). Aggregate adjustments, such as those from pre-tax to post-tax income (problem (c)), are not necessary, although in some cases imputations are necessary at the household level. The data all cover, at least in principle, the whole population (avoiding problem (b)).
The aim of the LIS project is to increase the degree of cross-national comparability, but it is important to emphasise that complete cross-national comparability is not attainable. 5 The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) project began in 1983 under the joint sponsorship of the government of Luxembourg and the Centre for Population, Poverty, and Policy Studies (CEPS) in Walferdange. It is now funded on a continuing basis by CEPS/INSTEAD and by the science foundations of its member countries. The main objective of the LIS project has been to create a database containing social and economic data collected in household surveys from different countries. The database currently contains information for some 25 countries for one or more years. Extensive documentation concerning technical aspects of the survey data, and the social institutions of income provision in member countries is being made available to users.
Comparability is a matter of degree, and all that one can hope for is to reach an acceptably high level. Moreover, comparability does not imply accuracy. A critic may say that it reduces all data sets to the lowest common denominator. There may remain serious shortcomings in the extent to which we can measure economic advantage and disadvantage. These qualifications must be borne in mind when reading this paper. We have some idea as to where the mines are located, but we have to tread very carefully.
Incomes in European Countries in the 1980s: The Shape of the Distribution
This section looks at the shape of the distribution of disposable income in fourteen European countries and the United States. In the majority of cases, the results refer to the period 1984-1987, but some relate to the start of the 1980s (Portugal, Spain and Switzerland).
Comparisons across countries may be sensitive not just to the data comparability but also to the form of presentation. We begin by considering disposable income per equivalent adult, using an "intermediate" equivalence scale of household size to the power of a half, and by looking at percentiles of the median.
Percentiles of the Distribution
The first method of presentation (Table 3) we can see that there is a group of countries with higher ratios, in excess of 4, including Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland. Switzerland and France are quite close to the UK, but there are distinctly lower ratios in Benelux, Germany and the Nordic countries. The decile ratios appear to be inversely related to latitude, if Ireland is included with Southern Europe. It is interesting to note that the decile ratio in the United States, included in Table 3 as a memorandum item, is close to 6, and this is the largest value recorded here. It is in fact off the scale in Figure 1 .
Before looking at what lies behind these decile ratios, we should consider their sensitivity to the method of calculation. This issue is examined in Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) and here reference is only made to the results shown in the right hand part of Figure 1 , which are intended to test the sensitivity to the method used to calculate equivalent income. It shows the ranking according to the decile ratio of per capita income (Portugal and Spain excluded). Although standard practice in Eastern Europe (see Atkinson and Micklewright, 1992) , per capita distributions are rarely presented in OECD countries. 6 For all countries, except Norway, the decile ratio is increased, but the difference varies quite a lot across countries. The decile ratio in Sweden increases from 2.72 to 2.95, whereas that in the Netherlands increases from 2.85 to 3.46, taking it out of the "less unequal" group. France, Switzerland and the UK are now more in line with Italy. While the broad picture is not greatly changed by the use of different equivalence scales, both the level of measured inequality and the position of individual countries can be materially affected.
Shape of the Distribution
The high value of the decile ratio in the US is due in large part to the low value of the bottom decile relative to the median. This is brought out in Figure 2 The shape of the distribution is shown more generally in Figure 4 for France, Sweden and the US. This shows the (logarithm) of the income level corresponding to different percentiles. The diagram is like Pen's parade of incomes, except that the heights have been adjusted so that the median person in each country passes through at eye level (0 on the scale) and that the differences are shown in relative rather than absolute terms.
The parade starts with the bottom decile. As we know, incomes at this point are a lot lower in the US. The height rises more steeply to reach the median, but beyond that point increases at almost the same rate. France and Sweden start at the same level as each other, but the heights rise more quickly towards the median in Sweden. After the median, they rise more slowly in Sweden, and France is closer to the US. It may be seen that incomes in Sweden are more centred on the median than in the other two countries. If we take a band from 80% of the median to 125%, as indicated in Figure 4 , then only around a quarter (27.8 percent) of the US population are found in this central range. In France, the proportion is around a third (35.9 percent), whereas in Sweden it is approaching one half (46.4 percent). This is an interesting difference between the income distributions in the different countries. From the results of Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) , it may be seen that the middle income class is also large in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and Norway. The middle income class is small in Ireland, Italy and the UK, in addition to the US.
Income Inequality in European Countries in the 1980s
A more common form of presentation of income distribution statistics is in terms of shares of total income, which are the ingredients for the conventional Lorenz curve. Table 4 shows the cumulative shares by decile groups, where S 10 denotes the share of the bottom 10 percent, S 20 denotes the share of the bottom 20 percent, etc. The countries are listed in order of the share of the bottom decile group, S 10 , which ranges from some 2½ percent in the UK to 4½ percent in Finland. The ranking is not identical to that according to the bottom decile, P 10 , since the share depends on the shape of the distribution in the bottom decile group, as well as on the mean, rather than the median. It may be noted that the UK and Switzerland tend to move down relative to their ranking according to P 10 (see Figure 2) .
The share of the bottom decile group gives the initial ranking of the Lorenz curves, but the Lorenz curves may subsequently cross. The decile shares are used in Table 5 to test whether or not the Lorenz curves cross. A + or (+) in the table indicates that the Lorenz curve for the country shown in the left hand column remains everywhere above that for the country shown on the horizontal axis; and a ? indicates that the Lorenz curves cross. Treating any difference as significant, there are in fact a high proportion of situations where a Lorenz comparison can be made. Of the 91 possible pair-wise comparisons of the 14 European countries, there are 70 cases where one Lorenz curve dominates the other. If, to make approximate allowance for the errors surrounding the estimates, cases are excluded where the differences for all decile shares are less than 1 percentage point (those cases marked (+) in Table 5 ) 7 , then there are 67 cases of Lorenz dominance. In over 70 percent of cases we have an unambiguous ranking.
The partial ordering resulting from the Lorenz comparisons (taking only those cases where the difference is 1 percentage point or larger) are summarised in Figure 5 in terms of a 7 It would clearly be possible to calculate the sampling errors associated with the Lorenz curve, and require that one curve be significantly different from another at a specified level of confidence. However, this focuses on sampling error to the exclusion of other, non-sampling, error, which may be quantitatively more important.
Hasse diagram. The countries towards the top of the diagram have the lower levels of inequality, and where a line can be traced downwards from country A to country B this implies that the Lorenz curve for country A is superior to that of country B. Finland dominates all countries, followed by Benelux and Norway and Sweden. There appears to be a clear grouping of mainland Northern Europe at the top. In the middle are France, Italy, the UK and Portugal, which cannot be ranked one against the other. The Lorenz curves for Italy and Portugal are close; those for France, and even more the UK, start off lower and end up higher.
Summary Measures of Inequality
Where the Lorenz curves cross, the use of a summary measure of inequality yields a complete ranking, although different measures may generate different such rankings. In Table 6 are shown the Gini coefficients and equally distributed equivalent (Atkinson) measures with inequality aversion parameters 0.5 and 1.0.
The results for the Gini coefficients suggest a ranking of countries which is rather different from that of Sawyer, who found a higher value for the Gini coefficient in West Germany than in the US, and for whom Netherlands and Spain were virtually indistinguishable.
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the nine countries common to both lists (including the US) is 0.5.
The results with the Atkinson indices are broadly similar. Cases where European countries move up the ranking compared with the Gini coefficient are shown in italics in Table 6 .
With an inequality aversion parameter of 1.0, Luxembourg moves up to second place and Sweden drops to fifth, below Germany; Italy moves ahead of France and the UK.
Recent Trends in Income Distribution: Evidence from the LIS Dataset
There is considerable interest in how the distribution of income has been changing over time, particularly over the 1980s. 8 For eight of the fourteen European countries discussed in the previous section we have comparable information for two dates: Belgium, Finland, France, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These cover a range of countries, both with regard to their intrinsic features and with regard to what we have seen about the degree of income inequality. However, the two data points are not the same in each country, and the results need to be interpreted with care in view of the differing macro-economic climate at different dates and in different countries.
Percentiles of the Distribution
The changes in the percentiles are shown in Table The decile ratio increased in Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and (slightly) in Belgium. It remained unchanged in France and fell modestly in Portugal. In broad terms, this summarises the picture that emerges throughout this section. The majority of countries covered here show a rise in inequality, but this is not universal and the extent of the increase differs. There is diversity of experience across countries. Moreover, the pattern of change has distinctive features. Even among those countries where inequality increased, we find differences. If, for instance, we look at the top decile relative to the median, then we find little change in the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is the decline in the relative position of the bottom groups that is responsible for the rise in the decile ratio. In contrast, the rise in the decile ratio in the UK over this period is the product of the rise in the relative position of the top decile.
In the US, both the top decile rose and the bottom decile fell. 8 Recent reviews of the evidence about trends in income inequality in different countries include Bourguignon and Morrisson (1992) , Gottschalk (1993) , Green, Henley and Tsakalotos (1992) , and Gardiner (1993) .
In the US, the changes between 1979 and 1986 were associated with a contraction of the central income group: the proportion between 80% and 125% of the median fell from 31.1 percent to 27.8 percent. There were increases in the size of both the lower and the upper income groups. Over a similar period (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) the percentage in the central group fell also in Sweden, from 49.3 percent to 46.4 percent, but the increase was almost entirely in the lower group. In contrast, in France the proportion in the central group did not change between 1979 and 1984.
Lorenz Curves
The changes in the Lorenz curves are shown in Table 8 for the eight European countries and the US. In France, the Lorenz curves cross, but they are virtually identical in the two years, the maximum difference in the cumulative decile shares being 0.3 percentage points. In Portugal the Lorenz curve moves upwards, the maximum difference over 10 years being 0.8 percentage points. For the remaining six European countries, and the US, the Lorenz curve moves downwards, to varying degrees.
In both Netherlands and Norway the share of the bottom 50 percent fell on average by 0.1 percentage point per year (in Belgium the fall was smaller), whereas the average rate of fall was larger in Finland, and was 0.2 percentage points or higher in Sweden, the UK and the US. As far as changes over time are concerned, the US does not appear to be an outlier. In the US, the total difference over the 7 year period in the cumulative decile shares is at least 1 percentage point from the third decile upwards, whereas in Sweden (over a 6 year period) this is true from the second decile and in the UK for all decile shares. The maximum difference in the Lorenz curve in the US is 2.7 percentage points, which is the same as in the UK.
A similar picture is shown by the summary measures of inequality. The rise in the Gini coefficient is 3.2 percentage points in the US and 3.4 percentage points in the UK (Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding, 1995, Table 4.8) . By historical standards this is a noteworthy increase.
The rise in Sweden is 2.1 percentage points, and that in Norway around half this amount. In France the Gini coefficient remained virtually unchanged between 1979 and 1984;  in Portugal there was a modest decline over the 1980s. Again there is diversity of experience: the upward trend in income inequality is exhibited to differing degrees in different countries, and is not to be found in some countries.
Recent Trends in Income Distribution: Evidence from National Studies
In this section, we set the earlier results in the context of national studies of income inequality and extend the coverage to include Denmark. In reviewing the evidence available from other studies, we do not attempt a comprehensive survey of all published material. Rather, our purpose is to build a bridge between the LIS dataset, with its emphasis on raising the degree of comparability of the data employed, and the much more disparate national studies, which for understandable reasons have employed a wide variety of sources and definitions. Since we are concerned to compare the LIS dataset with other approaches, we do not refer to other studies which are based on the LIS dataset, such as Smeeding, O'Higgins and Rainwater (1990) .
The Gini coefficients in Table 9 are drawn from national studies of income inequality which are not designed for purposes of international comparison, and they are not necessarily based on the same types of sources, the same concepts of income or the same methods of calculation. For example, the US series, unlike those for other countries shown, relates to the distribution of gross income (before taxes) and is not adjusted for household size. We have chosen series which give a reasonable span of years and which are themselves intended to be consistent over time. They therefore may serve to give an indication of the relative trends in different countries, but it should be stressed that one can draw no conclusions from these figures about the relative degree of inequality in different countries. (The main respects in which the series differ from those in earlier sections of the paper are identified in the notes to Table 9 .) In view of the differences in definitions, sources, and timing, we would not necessarily expect the results from the national studies to show the same level of inequality as we found in earlier sections. Nor need the trends be the same, in that the differences may have a different impact at different dates. The trends in the national studies are however of particular interest in view of the fact that the estimates typically cover a longer time period and include more observations.
We saw in Section 4 that in the first half of the 1980s there was a marked rise in income inequality in Sweden and the UK. This rise is the more striking in that it came after a period in which inequality fell: there was a reversal of the previous trend. The U-shaped pattern -the inverse of that predicted by the Kuznets hypothesis -is illustrated in Figure 6 . As may be seen, the pattern in the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark has some similarity, although in Denmark it is only the last year (1987) in which there is any indication of an upturn in inequality. But in other countries, such as those shown in Figure 7 , the pattern is less clearly U-shaped. In Finland and France, it appears to be a case of the trend towards reduced inequality having come to a stop;
in Germany there is no marked trend; in Ireland and Italy the downward trend continued, in the latter case with a cyclical component.
The pattern across countries does not therefore appear to be a uniform one. While it is possible that the countries in Figure 7 are lagging behind the UK and Sweden, and that the 1990s will see a rise in income inequality more generally, this has yet to be demonstrated. Moreover, among the countries where inequality is rising, the rate of increase differs, with the UK standing out for the sharpness of the rise in recorded income inequality in the second-half of the 1980s.
It may be noted that there is no apparent relation between the trend over the 1980s and the overall level of inequality. Inequality has increased both in the United States, with a high level even before the increase, and in Sweden, where inequality has historically been relatively low. Inequality has fallen in Italy, but risen in the UK, both occupying intermediate positions in the mid-1980s.
Concluding Comments
This review of evidence for different European countries is only partial, but it suggests two broad conclusions.
First, certain groupings may be made. The Scandinavian countries, Benelux and West Germany have apparently distinctly less inequality in disposable equivalent income; Southern Europe and Ireland have distinctly higher inequality, with France and, to some degree, the UK and Italy, occupying an intermediate position. The ranking of countries is rather different from that of the earlier study by Sawyer and more suggestive of explanatory hypotheses -such as the differing form and extent of social protection, and the role of redistributive income taxation.
Secondly, we can no longer assume that all European countries are comfortably on the downward part of the Kuznets curve, with inequality falling over time. Continuing progression towards reduced inequality was in the 1980s the exception rather than the rule. In a number, but not all, of the countries studied, inequality increased. We suspect that Kuznets himself would scarcely have been taken aback by the finding that the inverse-U shape no longer applies, since he referred frequently to the balancing of conflicting effects. Changes in the distribution of income are the outcome of several forces operating in different directions. As the balance of these forces varies, we may expect the resulting trend in inequality to change direction. In the same way, alternative explanations have differing importance at different dates. Note: * Estimated by applying average tax rates to pre-tax data Source: Sawyer (1976) , Tables 4 and 6 . 
Sources:
Portugal: supplied by C Rodrigues (see Rodrigues, 1993) . Spain: supplied by M Mercader (see Mercader, 1993) . All other from Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) , Table 4 .1. Table 3 . All other from Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) , Table 4 .3. 
Portugal: see Table 3 . All other from Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) , Table 4 .7. 
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Note: 3.0 denotes that the decile ratio lies between 3.00 and 3.09.
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